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Abstract
Americans spent about 46 percent of their total food budget on food away from
home in 2002, up from 27 percent in 1962.  Such foods tend to be less nutritious
and higher in calories than foods prepared at home, and some studies have linked
eating away from home to overweight and obesity in adults and children.  Current
nutrition labeling law exempts much of the food-away-from-home sector from
mandatory labeling regulations.  Because consumers are less likely to be aware of
the ingredients and nutrient content of away-from-home food than of foods
prepared at home, public health advocates have called for mandatory nutrition
labeling for major sources of food away from home, such as fast-food and chain
restaurants.  This report provides an economic assessment of a food-away-from-
home nutrition labeling policy, including justifications for policy intervention and
potential costs and benefits of the policy.
Keywords: Diet quality, food labeling, government regulation, health, mandatory
disclosure, nutrition information, Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, obesity,
reformulation
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TX360.U6Summary
Americans spent about 46 percent of their total food budget on food away
from home in 2002, up from 27 percent in 1962.  USDA’s food intake
surveys show that between 1977-78 and 1994-96, the share of daily caloric
intake from food away from home increased from 18 percent to 32 percent.
While there are clear convenience benefits to consumers for substituting
ready-to-eat foods prepared away from home for foods prepared at home,
there are also costs.  Studies suggest that foods consumed away from home
are more calorie-dense and nutritionally poorer compared with foods
prepared at home.  Some studies have found an association between eating
away from home and overweight and obesity in adults and children.
What Is the Issue?
Current nutrition labeling law exempts much of the food-away-from-home
sector from mandatory labeling regulations.  Because consumers are less
likely to be aware of the ingredients and nutrient content of away-from-
home food than of foods prepared at home, public health advocates have
called for mandatory nutrition labeling for major sources of these foods,
such as fast-food and chain restaurants. 
What are the potential benefits and costs of a mandatory labeling policy for
both consumers and the away-from-home food industry? Mandatory
labeling could increase market efficiency and social welfare by allowing
consumers to make informed choices.  However, for the policy to be
economically efficient, the benefits from the policy intervention should
outweigh the costs.
What Did the Study Find?
This study takes a preliminary look at whether consumers might make more
healthful food choices if nutrition labeling was mandated for the away-
from-home food sector, and how labeling requirements would in turn affect
the foodservice industry. 
The costs of a labeling policy will depend chiefly on how much of the
away-from-home food sector is subject to the mandatory disclosure require-
ment. Costs can be assessed reasonably well and include labeling costs, the
cost of chemical analysis needed to determine the nutrient content of offer-
ings, and reformulation costs. 
The benefits of a labeling policy are harder to assess because the effect of
label information on improving nutritional and health outcomes is uncertain.
Research indicates that providing additional nutrition information in a
restaurant setting has a limited effect on overall diet quality and reduced
caloric intakes. 
As a result of mandatory labeling requirements, producers may voluntarily
decide to reformulate products to make them more attractive nutritionally.
This reformulation could ultimately benefit all consumers, not just those
who read nutrition labels.
iii
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However, studies have shown that producers behave strategically in such
situations—for example, by reducing the price of less healthful foods—
adding to the uncertainty about the eventual effect of reformulation on
consumer diets.
Perhaps the largest benefit of labeling may accrue when consumers change
their food choices based on the nutrition information provided by the labels.
Although such substitutions may not change nutritional or health outcomes
substantially, consumers benefit from being able to make food choices that
are better aligned with their preferences.
The distribution of the costs and benefits among producers and consumers
may also influence a labeling policy decision.  Away-from-home food
providers have different types of offerings, economies of scale, and levels of
recipe standardization. Thus, a labeling policy will affect each provider
differently. On the consumer side, the key question is whether those who
already have good quality diets and healthy weights will reap the benefits, or
whether those with poor diets and the overweight will share those benefits.
How Was the Study Conducted?
Research for this report included a literature review to gather evidence on
the economic theory of information and labeling and on previous studies on
the influence of nutrition information, labeling, and reformulation on food
intakes. The research also included a statistical analysis of data from
USDA’s Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals (CSFII) from
1989-91 and 1994-96 to estimate the effect of mandatory labeling require-
ments on product reformulation.1
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Introduction
A notable change in U.S. food consumption patterns in the last several
decades has been the increasing popularity of foods prepared outside the
home (food away from home).  Food-away-from-home expenditures as a
share of total food spending have risen steadily over the last several decades
while the share of food-at-home expenditures has fallen (fig. 1).  In 2002,
Americans spent an estimated 46 percent of their total food budget on away-
from-home foods, up from 27 percent in 1962.  Increasingly, even food
consumed at home may be a take-out meal from a restaurant, a drive-
through meal from a fast-food outlet, a ready-to-eat meal from a super-
market, or a meal delivered to the home (Davis and Stewart, 2002;
Jekanowski, 1999).  Estimates from USDA’s food intake surveys show that
between 1977-78 and 1994-96, the share of daily caloric intake from food
away from home increased from 18 percent to 32 percent (fig. 2).  While all
age groups experienced the increase, it was highest among younger adults.
In 1994-96, men age 18-39 obtained 39 percent of their daily calories from
food prepared away from home, compared with 23 percent in 1977-78.  For
women of the same age group, the 1994-96 share was 37 percent compared
with 21 percent in 1977-78 (Guthrie et al., 2002). 
The rise in consumption of food away from home has paralleled the growing
prevalence of overweight and obesity among both juvenile and adult popula-
tions in the United States, and many public health advocates have implicated
an increased appetite for such food as a contributing factor (Nestle and
Jacobson, 2000).  The foodservice industry and restaurant groups reject any
link between the rising obesity rates and foods consumed in restaurants or
other away-from-home food sources.  They point out that restaurants have a
wide variety of menu choices and that customers must choose responsibly
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Figure 1
Share of total food expenditures spent on food at home and 
away from home
Source: Food Consumption (per capita) Data System, Economic Research Service, USDA.2
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USDA’s food intake data unambiguously show that away-from-home foods
tend to be of lower nutritional quality than food prepared at home (Lin et
al., 1999, 2001; Guthrie et al., 2002). Foods prepared away from home
contain more calories per eating occasion (meals and snacks) and are higher
in total fat, saturated fat, and cholesterol and lower in dietary fiber, calcium,
and iron on a per-calorie basis than food prepared at home (figs. 3 and 4).
Americans who consume a “poor” quality diet based on the Healthy Eating
Index tend to consume a greater proportion of their daily calories away from
home than those with a “good” quality diet (table 1).  Compared with those
with good quality diets, individuals with poor quality diets have lower per
capita expenditures on food away from home, but their away-from-home
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Source: Guthrie et al. (2002), and ERS calculations from Continuing Survey of Food Intake 
by Individuals, 1989-91.
Figure 2
Percent of calories from food away from home
32
At home Away from home
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Figure 3
Percent of calories from fat in at-home and away-from-home food,
1994-96
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While no study has conclusively shown that food away from home causes
overweight or obesity, some have found an association between body weight
status and food source.  For example, Binkley et al. (2000) found that,
among both men and women, those who consumed a higher proportion of
food from fast-food outlets tended to have a higher Body Mass Index
(BMI).  McCrory et al. (1999) reported a positive association between the
frequency of consuming restaurant food and higher levels of body fat in
adults.  In a State-level analysis using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System over the 1984-99 period, Chou et al. (2002) found that
a higher per capita number of restaurants was associated with higher BMI
levels and obesity.
Given the possible link between obesity and increasing consumption of food









At home Away from home
Figure 4 
Dietary fiber from at-home and away-from-home food, 1994-96
Source: Guthrie, Lin, and Frazao (2002).
gm/1,000 calories
Table 1—Food away from home and diet quality
Diet quality class
Characteristic Good Needs improvement Poor
Annual per capita expenditures 700 6305 4 3
on food away from home ($)
Mean energy from food away 233 4 33
from home per day (% of total 
energy intake)
Food-away-from-home energy 1.19 1.23 1.39
density (calories/gram of food)
Food-at-home energy density 0.83 0.89 0.93
(calories/gram of food)
Source: Author’s calculations from the Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals
(CSFII), 1994-96. The diet quality classification is based on the Healthy Eating Index (Velu 
and Variyam, 2003).4
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improving the nutritional quality of foods served in the food-away-from-
home market.  One proposed intervention would require menu boards and
food packages in restaurants and other away-from-home sources of food to
display nutrition information like that on the familiar “Nutrition Facts”
panel found on most packaged foods sold in stores.  The standardized
“Nutrition Facts” panel, which lists information on macronutrients such as
calories, total fat, saturated fat, and cholesterol in packaged foods, is the
outcome of the 1990 Federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
(NLEA).  While NLEA requires nutrition labeling of most processed food
products, there are important exemptions.  Food prepared for immediate
consumption—including restaurant meals, ready-to-eat foods prepared by
carryout establishments, foods served in hospital cafeterias and airplanes,
and that sold by foodservice vendors—are exempt from nutrition labeling.
This exemption is revoked only if vendors make nutrition or health claims
such as “low fat” or “heart healthy.” In such cases, restaurant owners or
foodservice providers must be able to demonstrate that there is a reasonable
basis for believing that the food qualifies for such a claim.  However,
exempted foods are not required to display the “Nutrition Facts” panel
(Foulke, 1996).
According to the foodservice industry, “nearly all major foodservice opera-
tors have nutrition information programs in place to satisfy the public’s
desire to know the nutritive value of the meals which they are consuming
away from home” (Livingston, 1995).  For example, many fast-food chains
provide nutrition information in brochures or restaurant wall displays and on
their web sites.  However, menu boards and packages often do not list the
nutrient content of specific food items or meals.  Public health advocates
contend that this lack of information limits the consumer’s ability to make
informed choices.  As a result, many are calling for extending the manda-
tory nutrition labeling law to major away-from-home providers of food.  For
example, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), a nutrition
and health advocacy group, has called for legislation to require restaurant
chains with 10 or more stores to list on their menus the calories, saturated
and trans fats, and sodium content of their standard menu items (CSPI,
2003).  A similar proposal appears in Nestle (2002).  These proposals are
not new.  A National Academy of Sciences study coinciding with the orig-
inal NLEA legislation recommended mandatory labeling for food away
from home (Porter and Earl, 1990).  Padberg (1992, 1999) proposed devel-
oping a “meal nutrition quality index” to rate entrees on restaurant menus.
Economics of Labeling
Rising consumption of food away from home is driven by both demand- and
supply-side forces.  On the demand side, more women in the labor force and
increases in real wages (inter alia) have increased the value of time and the
demand for convenience. The income effect is reflected in the fact that
expenditures on food away from home are more responsive to increases in
income than at-home food expenditures.  Studies show a 10-percent increase
in income will lead to a 4.6-percent increase in a household’s away-from-
home food expenditures, compared with a 1.3-percent increase in at-home
food expenditures (Davis and Stewart, 2002).  On the supply side, techno-
logical advances in food processing and transportation have enabled the5
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industry to provide an increasing variety of convenient fast food, take-out
meals, and home-delivered food, which effectively reduce the time-price of
foods (Davis and Stewart, 2002; Jekanowski, 1999; Jekanowski et al.,
2001).
The amount of away-from-home food consumption and its dietary quality
are the outcome of these demand and supply forces.  As Lin et al. (1999)
note, “Food away from home does not have to differ nutritionally from food
prepared at home.  Indeed, professional chefs and foodservice organizations
may be particularly adept at preparing tasty meals that meet dietary recom-
mendations.  However, consumer demand for such meals must be strong
enough to create an economic incentive for increased marketing of nutri-
tious items by restaurants, fast-food, and other foodservice establishments.”
Although empirical studies have found an association between away-from-
home food consumption and obesity, they have not established a causal rela-
tionship.  For instance, Chou et al. (2002) caution that, although the rising
number of fast-food restaurants is related to higher obesity rates, the
industry may simply be responding to an increase in the value of leisure
time.  In other words, a third factor—the higher value of time—may be
contributing to both increased consumption of food away from home and
increased obesity.
Criteria for Intervention
In theory, uninterrupted interplay of demand and supply forces ensure
socially optimal allocation of resources in smoothly functioning competitive
markets.  However, there are important exceptions where markets may fail
to allocate resources optimally, in which case appropriate government inter-
vention can potentially increase social welfare.1 Few would dispute that the
food-away-from-home market is competitive.  Therefore, the lower nutri-
tional quality of food away from home or a possible link to obesity is not in
itself enough to suggest or justify an intervention policy that mandates
provision of nutrition information.  If consumers are informed about the
nutritional quality of food away from home, or can readily obtain such
information at a cost they are willing to pay, and are making rational trade-
offs between current consumption and potential future health consequences,
an intervention policy that imposes costs on the market participants would
be inefficient (in the sense that costs of the policy would outweigh any
benefits from it).
However, a closer look at the economic case for nutrition labeling suggests
that a policy of mandatory labeling for food away from home could be justi-
fied in two ways.2 The first justification rests on the existence of a market
failure in the food-way-from-home market due to an information problem
between buyers and sellers.  Specifically, the market may lack a credible
mechanism to inform buyers about nutritional attributes of products that
sellers know about.  This information deficit may lead consumers to make
choices they wouldn’t have made with full information.  
The second justification stems from a problem in the economic theory on
which the intervention criteria are based.  Specifically, consumers may not
be the astute and forward-looking decisionmakers that economic theory
1The corollary of this is that gov-
ernment intervention in the absence of
market failure will reduce social wel-
fare.  However, government interven-
tion in markets can be based on
noneconomic criteria.  For example, a
public health approach may dictate
specific interventions, including label-
ing of food away from home, to influ-
ence an outcome such as obesity.  This
report focuses only on economic crite-
ria for intervention.
2A more detailed discussion of the
economics of information regulation
and labeling can be found elsewhere.
See, for example, Beales et al. (1981);
Golan et al. (2000); Teisl and Roe
(1998).6
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assumes them to be.  Instead, they may have limited self-control and
bounded rationality that lead them to make choices that do not maximize
utility.  In both these cases, an intervention policy such as labeling could
provide a mechanism for consumers to make better dietary choices and thus
increase their own and society’s welfare.3
Asymmetric Information in the 
Food-Away-From-Home Market
The smooth flow of product information between sellers and buyers
increases the efficiency of markets in allocating resources among competing
ends.  Information about product attributes will enable consumers to make
efficient choices by buying products that best match their attribute prefer-
ences.  In turn, sellers will have an incentive to supply and compete based
on favored attributes.  Conversely, the presence of imperfect or asymmetric
information among market participants can diminish market efficiency and
reduce social welfare.  When consumers fail to choose products with attrib-
utes that match their preferences, producers will lack signals to provide the
preferred attributes or to compete based on them.  This reduces market effi-
ciency and product quality.  In markets where sellers have information about
product quality that cannot be credibly conveyed to the buyers (that is,
buyers have no way of knowing if the information is accurate or truthful),
only poor-quality products will be sold and, in the extreme case, the market
may collapse (Akerlof, 1970).  In such markets, mandatory information
disclosure laws may increase social welfare by enabling sellers to credibly
convey information and by aiding buyers to choose products that better
match their preferences.
Most foods possess nutritional attributes that are referred to as credence
attributes (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996).  Consumers cannot learn about
credence attributes readily through inspection or even after consumption.
Arguably, except through a costly information search, many consumers
would have difficulty assessing the calories in or the saturated fat content of
a purchased meal, comparing nutrient contents of different entrees from a
supplier, or comparing nutrient contents of similar offerings from different
suppliers.  Sellers, however, are better informed about the ingredients used
in preparation, the proportions in which they were mixed, the cooking
methods used, and thus the nutritional attributes of the meal.4 Thus, the
food-away-from-home market has the hallmarks of a market characterized
by imperfect and asymmetric information.
However, the mere presence of attributes that are costly or difficult for
consumers to evaluate in itself does not imply a market failure and justifica-
tion for intervention.  For the attributes valued by consumers, freely func-
tioning markets provide incentives for sellers or third parties to disclose
information without mandatory labeling laws.  Information can be costly to
produce and distribute, and consumers may not value all types of informa-
tion.  However, under certain conditions, firms selling superior quality prod-
ucts will have an incentive to disclose this product information to the buyers
(Grossman, 1981).  When some firms disclose information about product
attributes, consumers may turn skeptical about sellers who do not.  This
competitive pressure leads to an increased availability of product informa-
3Another economic case for
mandatory labeling may arise, albeit
indirectly, if one individual’s food-
away-from-home decisions affect the
utility or welfare of other individuals
in the society.  For argument’s sake,
suppose high food-away-from-home
consumption is causally linked to obe-
sity and higher risk of heart disease.
The cost of medical treatment of these
conditions will be borne not just by
individuals with high food-away-
from-home consumption, but will be
shared by other individuals through
employer and public health systems.
Economists describe such situations
as externalities.  To the extent that
such externalities arise from informa-
tion problems in the food-away-from-
home market, mandatory nutrition
labeling may be one of the policy
options for increasing social welfare.
See Golan et al. (2000) for a more
detailed discussion.
4Suppliers would face a cost in
determining the nutritional profile of
their meals.  The marginal cost of such
information would decline with the
degree of recipe standardization.  Such
costs are also reduced by publicly
available information on the nutrient
content of foods; for example, USDA’s
Nutrient Data Laboratory,
www.nal.usda.gov/fnic/foodcomp/.7
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tion from all but firms with the lowest quality products.  Whether this
increased availability of information occurs in practice depends crucially on
the condition that sellers can convey quality information in an effective,
low-cost, and truthful manner.  Consumers must have a credible way to
separate truthful claims from spurious ones.  In markets that do not provide
this condition, voluntary disclosure leads to only partial availability of
product information and consumers may benefit from mandatory disclosure
laws (Mathios, 2000).
Under current nutrition labeling regulations (the NLEA), restaurants and
other away-from-home providers of food are permitted to make specific
nutrient content claims so long as they substantiate the claims with relevant
nutrition information if sought by consumers.  Therefore, a credible mecha-
nism is in place for voluntary labeling.  The level of disclosure, however,
depends on the cost of labeling (such as assessing the nutrient content of
recipes, mentioned earlier; see footnote 4) and the benefit of labeling
derived from consumer demand for nutrition information.  Indeed, if
consumer demand for nutrition information is strong enough, this should
provide a powerful incentive for disclosure.
The nutrient composition of processed and prepared foods, however, has
specific characteristics that create disincentives for producers to disclose
nutritional information.  First, for disclosure to be effective, consumers must
be able to infer the quality of products for which there is no disclosure; that
is, how inferior in quality are products without disclosure compared with
products that have disclosure.  For nutritional attributes such as fiber or
calcium that have a positive health value, consumers may assume that undis-
closed products have none of the attribute.  For negative attributes such as
energy, fat, or sodium, there is no such natural upper bound.  Therefore,
consumers will have difficulty in assessing the inferiority of products that
do not disclose compared with products that do. This may limit the flow of
information under a voluntary disclosure regime.
Second, and perhaps more important, ingredients that are positively valued
by consumers for their taste (sugar, oils, salt) also provide the nutrients
(calories, fat, sodium) that are negatively valued for their health effects.
Human taste for food is largely determined by fat, sugar, and salt
(Drewnowski, 1998; Levine et al., 2003).  Therefore, producers use more of
these ingredients to make their products more desirable.  If revealing the
nutritional characteristics associated with these ingredients reduces the
demand for their products, producers have an incentive against supplying
the information.5
The actual extent of voluntary disclosure in the food-away-from-home
market under current rules is an empirical matter.  Anecdotal evidence
suggests that some providers, especially in the fast-food market, do compete
based on disclosure of nutritional information (for example, a leading sand-
wich chain advertising the availability of sandwiches with 6 grams of fat or
less).  Others, as noted earlier, provide nutritional information in brochures,
wall displays, or on their web sites.  These disclosures, however, may have
been prompted more by legal considerations than as a competitive strategy
under the NLEA’s voluntary disclosure rules (CSPI, 2003).  While there
have been no formal studies on whether or to what extent disclosure has
5For some specialized foods, if pro-
ducers perceive that consumers value
taste from an attribute sufficiently
higher than its negative health effect,
they may choose to disclose that attrib-
ute (to distinguish their product from
those that have less of it).  Under the
labeling rules in the European Union, a
product can be labeled as chocolate if
it contains at least 1 percent of cacao
(beans of the cacao plant that provides
the chocolate liquor).  Because of this
rule, many European chocolate manu-
facturers compete by disclosing the
cacao content of their chocolates, even
though higher cacao content means
higher fat; cacao beans contain about
54 percent fat (Wolke, 2004).8
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worked in the food-away-from-home market, some lessons can be drawn
from changes that occurred in the market for packaged foods prior to and
following NLEA implementation.  
Mojduszka and Caswell (2000) examined labeling information on packages
in 33 food product categories over pre- and post-NLEA periods from 1992-
1999.  They concluded that incentives for voluntary disclosure of nutritional
content by food processing firms prior to NLEA did not generally result in
reliable and consistent nutrition information available to consumers.
Mathios (2000) used supermarket scanner and nutrition label data that
spanned the pre- and post-NLEA periods in the salad dressing market to
address the consequences of moving from voluntary to mandatory labeling.
He found voluntary disclosure to be an important market mechanism.  Prior
to the NLEA, all low-fat salad dressings had a nutrition label, while the
majority of higher fat dressings did not.  However, large variation in fat
content remained among dressings that did not voluntarily label.  Sales for
those with the highest fat levels declined significantly after the NLEA.  The
fact that the relevant nutritional attribute—fat content—is valued negatively
for its health effect may be a reason for partial disclosure in the salad
dressing market and may explain why mandatory labeling had an impact.
Mathios concluded that even in markets with credible, low-cost mechanisms
for disclosure, mandatory labeling can influence consumer choices.
The raw meat and poultry products market provides an instance where a
voluntary labeling mechanism was attempted.  The U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service’s (FSIS) initial rules for
nutrition labeling (effective July 1994) required mandatory labeling of most
meat and poultry products.  However, raw, single-ingredient meat and
poultry products such as chicken breasts, ground beef, and whole unbasted
turkey were exempted, although manufacturers and retailers of these prod-
ucts were encouraged to voluntarily provide nutrition information.  FSIS
indicated that it would monitor participation in the voluntary labeling
program and would consider mandatory labeling regulation if participation
remained below 60 percent.  Evaluations in 1996 and 1999 found voluntary
labeling to be below this limit (58 percent and 55 percent, respectively).6
Therefore, in 2000, FSIS initiated a proposal to extend mandatory nutrition
labeling to single-ingredient raw meat and poultry products (U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, 2001). 
Consumer Irrationality7
The standard economic model in which unhindered market transactions lead
to optimal allocation of resources relies on the assumption that consumers
are rational economic agents who make choices so as to maximize utility
over their lifetime.  Consumers may trade off future well-being for current
pleasure, but they do so fully informed (or informed to the extent they are
willing to invest in information) about the consequences.  A growing body
of evidence, however, has questioned this basic economic assumption about
consumer rationality.  Specifically, while rational forward-looking behavior
rests on individuals having stable time preferences or discount rates (that is,
the rate at which an individual values current consumption against future
consumption), an emerging body of evidence seems to suggest that discount
6One reason limiting more wide-
spread labeling in the market for sin-
gle-ingredient meat and poultry prod-
ucts may be that producers have limit-
ed opportunity to differentiate their
products based on nutritional charac-
teristics.
7Here, the word irrational is used in
the sense of deviating from the eco-
nomic assumption of rationality.9Gruber and Mullainathan (2002)
present empirical evidence in support
of this implication.  Using independent
data from the United States and
Canada, they found that when excise
taxes on cigarettes rise, those who are
predicted to be smokers report signifi-
cantly higher subjective well-being,
suggesting that a time-inconsistent
model is more appropriate.
9
Nutrition Labeling in the Food-Away-From-Home Sector/ERR-4
Economic Research Service/USDA
rates are both unstable and vary across different types of choices over time
(Frederick et al., 2002).  Economists have evoked such inconsistency in
preferences to explain behaviors involving lack of self-control (e.g.,
intending to exercise but putting it off when the time comes) in which indi-
viduals seem to be acting against their own self-interest.8
Dropping the assumption of stable discount rates in favor of time-
inconsistent preferences has dramatic implications for public policy.  For
example, Gruber and Koszegi (2001) studied the implications of cigarette
taxes on smokers with time-consistent and time-inconsistent preferences.
Time-consistent smokers make smoking decisions rationally, trading off
future health for current pleasure.  Time-inconsistent smokers want to quit
smoking but are unable to do so: they lack self-control.  A tax increase
reduces cigarette consumption of both types of smokers.  However, while
the higher tax leaves time-consistent smokers worse off, it makes time-
inconsistent smokers better off.  The reason is that the higher tax acts as a
commitment device that helps inconsistent smokers overcome their self-
control problem.9
Although evidence of time-inconsistent behavior is widespread, such
behavior is not universal.  Not all individuals lack self-control or procrasti-
nate in a particular situation.  Therefore, public policies to remedy time-
inconsistent behaviors should be “asymmetrically paternalistic,” that is,
benefit those who make errors while imposing little or no burden on those
who are making rational tradeoffs between current pleasure and future well-
being (Camerer et al., 2003).  One set of policies that meet the asymmetri-
cally paternalistic criteria is mandatory information disclosure.  In many
instances, relatively less intrusive policy changes, such as requiring firms to
disclose product information, might help irrational people make better deci-
sions, while having no effect (aside from reducing information costs) on
rational decisionmakers.  Nutrition labeling for food away from home would
seem to fit this criterion.  Readily available information about the nutrient
content of alternative menu items may provide a mechanism for self-control
for the irrational types while not harming the rational types.10 Whether and
to what degree the policy will be effective for the irrational types depends
on the degree of their self-control problems and their prevalence in the
population, about which little is known.11
Benefits and Costs of Labeling
Federal regulatory agencies are required to justify any new regulation by
evaluating its benefits and costs based on several criteria.  An example of
such evaluation can be found in FDA’s November 1999 proposal to amend
its nutrition labeling regulations to require listing the amount of trans fatty
acids (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999) on packaged
foods.  Any new regulation requiring nutrition labeling for food away from
home will be subject to such regulatory impact analysis.
10If the disclosure requirements
lead to higher product prices, rational
types could suffer a net welfare loss.
More generally, disclosure require-
ments would introduce costs, including
possible cognitive costs that need to be
weighed against benefits; see more on
this in the next section.
11An information disclosure policy
intended to enable better self-control
has implications for the type of dis-
closed information.  Information that
reveals the costs or benefits of the
attributes may be more effective.  For
example, rather than merely disclos-
ing the calorie content of a meal, a
label could make the tradeoff more
explicit by indicating the physical
activity equivalent of the calories.
However, whether such information or
any other type of nutritional informa-
tion may help consumers with self-
control problems remains to be empir-
ically verified.
8Although economists have only
recently begun to apply self-control
models to eating behaviors (e.g.,
Cutler, et al., 2004; Smith, 2004),
there is a rich psychological literature
in this area (e.g., Epstein and Saelens,
2000).10




One source of benefits from a mandatory food-away-from-home labeling
policy is a change in consumer behavior following the disclosure of nutri-
tional attributes.  Consumers may use the information to make more
healthful dietary choices, and this may result in better health outcomes such
as a reduction in morbidity and mortality associated with poor diet quality
and obesity.  Factors such as whether the information is important to a large
number of consumers (or extremely important to a small group of
consumers), the relative health effects of specific attributes listed on the
labels, and the ease with which information can be used by individuals, will
determine whether labeling will alter behavior enough to make a significant
difference in health outcomes.  Large benefits are gained if intake of a
dietary component that poses a conclusive and significant health risk is
altered following disclosure.  In the case of FDA’s November 1999 proposal
for listing the amount of trans fatty acids, the risk proved compelling
enough that the Office of Management and Budget, which oversees all
Federal regulations, urged FDA to accelerate publication of the final rule
(Office of Management and Budget, 2001).
On the other hand, benefits from better health outcomes may be negligible if
the disclosed information has little effect on dietary choices or the behav-
ioral effect produces insignificant health benefits.  Estimating the effect of
labeling on dietary choices in an away-from-home setting is methodologi-
cally challenging.  Although limited in number, experimental studies with
proper control of factors other than information that may affect dietary
intakes provide the best type of evidence.  Recent studies suggest that the
dietary effect of nutritional information in away-from-home settings may be
small or negligible (see box, “Effect of Nutrition Information on Food-
Away-From-Home Intakes”).  One study of food intake among normal-
weight women found that explaining the concept of energy density (amount
of calories per gram of food) and providing nutrition information on labels
during meals had no impact on subjects’ energy intake.  The pattern of food
intake was similar between subjects who received information and those
who did not (Kral et al., 2002).
Another experiment in an actual restaurant setting in England found that
provision of nutrition information had no effect on overall energy and fat
intake (Stubenitsky et al., 2000).  In fact, the presence of “lower fat” infor-
mation was “associated with a trend toward a decreased proportion of
restaurant patrons selecting the target dish.” Sproul et al. (2003) assessed
the effectiveness of nutrition labeling on sales of “healthy” lunch-time
entrées in an Army cafeteria.  Sales were compared between a 1-year base-
line period and two 30-day postintervention periods after the placement of
nutrition labels.  Analysis found no significant difference between the base-
line and the two intervention periods for either the mean sales of the healthy
(labeled) entrees or the proportion of healthy entrée to total entrée sales.
These findings suggest that the benefits of labeling (a change in consumer
behavior leading to better nutritional outcomes) may be small or uncertain at
best.  However, consumer response to labeling may depend on how the infor-11
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mation is provided, the content of the information, and the type of consumer
receiving the information.  Response to labeling or related forms of informa-
tion disclosure may also vary depending on the nutrient densities of the offer-
ings.  For example, the effect of disclosing the calories content of highly
energy-dense meals may be different from the effect of disclosing the calo-
ries content of meals with low or moderate energy densities.  This means,
depending on energy and other nutrient densities of menu items, response to
information disclosure in a fast-food restaurant may be different from
response to information disclosure in a sit-down restaurant.  Therefore, find-
ings from experimental studies discussed here must be generalized with care.
Reformulation
Even if a labeling policy has no direct effect on consumer intake, it could
still benefit consumers by improving nutritional outcomes through producer-
initiated reformulation of products.  Suppose a food-away-from-home
labeling policy requires disclosure of nutritionally negative attributes such
as calorie, fat, and sodium content.  Under such a mandatory disclosure rule,
firms selling products with high amounts of these nutrients may choose to
reformulate to reduce the nutrient amounts rather than risk losing sales (to
firms selling nutritionally better products).  Such reformulation could
Effect of Nutrition Information on 
Food-Away-From-Home Intakes
An exhaustive review of evidence is not attempted in this report.  Each of the
recent studies cited provides overviews of previous experimental studies on
the influence of nutrition information on food intakes.  Results from these
earlier studies are described as “conflicting” or “mixed.”
For example, Kral et al. (2002) reviewed studies that examined whether the
level of “dietary restraint” influenced the effect of nutrition information on
food intake.  Two studies they reviewed found that restrained eaters were
more responsive to nutrition information than unrestrained eaters, two studies
found the opposite result, and one found that both restrained and unrestrained
eaters responded to information.  In this last case (Shide and Rolls, 1995), the
response of both groups was that they consumed more energy at lunch after
eating a yogurt labeled “low-fat” than after eating a yogurt with similar energy
content but labeled “high-fat.”  In other words, subjects behaved as if they
have a nutrient budget; they used label information to adjust their subsequent
intake, though not necessarily in a way that would change their total daily
intake.  Caputo and Mattes (1993), Chapelot et al. (1995), and Aaron et al.
(1995) have reported similar results, where subjects informed of the lower fat
status of a dish increased their subsequent energy intakes.  These types of
substitutions would increase consumer welfare in an economic sense, although
no net nutritional change may be observed.  Such benefits from information-
induced substitutions are discussed further in a later section.
Other studies have noted that labels may produce expectations about taste.
For example, Yeomans et al. (2001) report that low-fat labels on soup
produced lower anticipated hedonic ratings and high-fat labels produced
higher hedonic ratings among subjects.  After consumption, soups labeled
high-fat were rated both as more pleasant and creamier than those labeled
low-fat, independent of actual fat content.  Producer knowledge about such
consumer response may limit voluntary reformulation and labeling.12
Nutrition Labeling in the Food-Away-From-Home Sector/ERR-4
Economic Research Service/USDA
change the entire range of market offerings and potentially result in better
nutritional outcomes for consumers.  Through product reformulation,
labeling may benefit all consumers who use the products, not just those who
read the label.  In fact, more healthy offerings resulting from reformulation
may be the largest benefit of labeling (Beales, 1980). 
Evidence about the degree of reformulation that may occur under a manda-
tory food-away-from-home labeling policy can be found by examining
response in the packaged foods sector following changes in the health claims
rules in the mid-1980s and the enforcement of the NLEA in 1994.  In 1985,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the FDA relaxed the rules
governing health claims in food advertising and labeling.  Citing several lines
of evidence, Mathios and Ippolito (1999) argued that this change in the regu-
latory environment led to significant product innovation and change in
consumer behavior.  For example, cereal manufacturers responded to their
new ability to advertise the health benefits of fiber by developing new high-
fiber cereals.  Between 1985 and 1987, fiber content of cereals for adult
consumption averaged 3.59 grams per ounce, compared with an average of
1.99 grams for cereals introduced between 1978 and 1984.
In a study of NLEA’s effect in the snack cracker market, Mayer et al. (1998)
found that for products containing information about fat content, the average
fat content and the average share of calories from fat per serving were
significantly lower in 1995 (post-NLEA) compared with 1991 (pre-NLEA).
In New Zealand, reformulation spurred a significant reduction of salt in
food products following the introduction of the Pick the Tick logo program,
which allows display of the logo on products that meet defined nutritional
criteria. According to Young and Swinburn (2002), in a 1-year period from
July 1998 to June 1999, Pick the Tick influenced food companies to exclude
about 33 tons of salt through reformulation of 23 breads, breakfast cereals,
and margarine.
The degree of reformulation following a food-away-from-home labeling
policy will depend on how much producers feel they can benefit from such
a strategy.  Consumers appear to value taste highly in food consumption
relative to other attributes.  For example, according to the 1994-96 Diet and
Health Knowledge Survey, 82 percent of adults consider taste as very
important when buying food, compared with only 63 percent who consider
nutrition as very important.  In a study on consumer valuation of product
attributes in the frankfurter market, Harris (1997) found that consumers
place a positive value on taste as indicated by the fat content.  Consumers
were willing to pay 0.67 cent for an additional gram of fat in each hot dog.
High consumer valuation of taste suggests that if the costs of reformulation
while preserving taste are high, reformulation may be limited.
Alternatively, while a certain degree of reformulation may occur in the
aftermath of a labeling policy, this may decline as firms observe consumer
response to the reformulated offerings.  Examining the salty snack market
over the 1995-99 period (recall that NLEA became effective in 1994),
Allshouse et al. (2002) observed that “food manufacturers … introduced
1,914 new reduced/low-fat products in 1995 and 2,076 in 1996.  The market
for these products, however, never grew as anticipated, as food processors
dramatically cut their new product introductions of lower fat products after13
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1996, introducing only 481 new products in 1999.” Mojduszka et al. (1999)
analyzed nutritional quality change in product offerings using data from all
offerings in five food categories (entrees, soup, salted snacks, cookies, and
processed meats and bacon) in a New England supermarket during 1992-95
and 1997.  Their analysis showed no significant change in the average nutri-
tional quality of products offered in any of the five categories.
Moorman (1998) provides perhaps the most detailed study of producer
response to mandatory labeling requirements (under the NLEA) using data
on branded products sold in 21 categories and new brand introductions over
pre- and post-NLEA periods.  Results showed that producers responded
strategically by changing the nutritional quality of base brands (brands that
are not positioned with regard to nutrition) and brand extensions (brands
positioned nutritionally, e.g., low-fat) in opposite ways.  Specifically,
compared with the pre-NLEA period, base brands that added positive nutri-
ents increased in the post-NLEA period, but those that reduced negative
nutrients did not change significantly.  Conversely, over the same period,
brand extensions involving deletion of negative nutrients increased while
those involving addition of positive nutrients remained unchanged.  Besides
this strategic reformulation response, firms also tended to use price promo-
tion strategy based on brand healthiness: more nutritionally poorer brands
were promoted in the post-NLEA period while promotion of nutritionally
better brands did not change significantly between the two periods.  These
results show the likely complexity of the reformulation effects of a food-
away-from-home labeling policy.
A potential problem with looking at a specific set of product categories to
assess reformulation effects is that it may not capture the effect of reformu-
lation in the entire sector on consumer diets.  Subject to some assumptions,
estimates of the overall reformulation effect of the NLEA on consumer diets
can be calculated from USDA’s 1989-91 and 1994-96 food consumption
surveys.  From representative samples of individuals, these surveys meas-
ured food intakes identified by the source—whether the food was purchased
at a store for at-home preparation and consumption or if it was purchased
from an away-from-home source.  Since mandatory NLEA labeling require-
ments are applicable only for packaged foods sold in stores, any effects of
reformulation in the post-NLEA period (1994-96) compared with the pre-
NLEA period (1989-91) should be reflected in changes in the at-home
dietary intakes between these periods.  Apart from the NLEA, diets could of
course have changed due to other factors.  However, to the extent that these
non-NLEA factors influence both the packaged food and food-away-from-
home sectors, their effect can be estimated from the dietary changes in the
away-from-home share of consumer diets.  Assuming NLEA is the only
factor that affected at-home consumption and not away-from-home
consumption, the NLEA-induced reformulation effect can be estimated by
subtracting dietary changes in away-from-home food consumption from
dietary changes in at-home consumption.  This procedure gives the reformu-
lation effect because the change is estimated for the entire population, not
just the label users (who may have changed their diets after reading the
label).  However, a large effect of label use may inflate the estimated refor-
mulation effect.  Because of this, and also because at-home diets may have
improved due to, say, a general increase in nutrition knowledge or other14




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.13As noted earlier, estimates in the
final column of table 2 can be inter-
preted as reformulation effects
because they are estimated for the
entire population, not just label users.
In a separate study that used a similar
procedure to estimate the label-use
effect of the NLEA, we found strong
evidence of a positive effect for fiber,
protein, and iron (Variyam, 2004).  As
can be seen from the final column of
table 2, the reformulation effects are
quite distinct from label effects; there
is no reformulation effect for fiber,
and the effects are negative for protein
and iron.
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factors that did not affect intakes of food away from home, the estimated
reformulation effect should be viewed as an upper bound of true reformula-
tion due to the NLEA.12
Subject to the above caveats, estimated reformulation effects over the pre-
and post-NLEA periods for 12 nutrients are presented in table 2.  To control
for possible changes in the amount of food consumed over the years and
across the food sources, all quantities are expressed as densities: energy is
expressed as calories per kilogram of food and other nutrients are expressed
per 1,000 calories.  The third column in the table reports change in at-home
intakes from the pre-NLEA period to the post-NLEA period and the sixth
column reports the same for away-from-home intakes.  The final column
gives the estimated average reformulation effects per day.  The effects are
significant and beneficial for energy, total fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, and
sodium.  Excepting saturated fat, the away-from-home intakes of these
nutrients did not decline significantly and, in fact, increased for energy,
while at-home intakes declined in all cases.  At-home protein intake
declined while carbohydrate intake increased.13 Much of the nutritional
concern in the mid-1990s was focused on reducing fat intakes.  This may
explain the increase in carbohydrate and the decrease in protein densities.  If
Moorman’s (1998) findings have wider applicability in other product cate-
gories, a greater consumer acceptance of new brands that focus on reducing
negative nutrients compared with those that focus on increasing positive
nutrients could explain the net decline in calcium, iron, and vitamin A
intakes.  Taken together, these results suggest that, over all the products
consumed, reformulation effects from a labeling policy may be large.
However, popular nutrition concerns in the relevant time period could also
affect reformulation and, in turn, alter nutritional outcomes for consumers in
unexpected ways.
Substitutions
Another benefit of a food-away-from-home labeling policy may accrue
when labels provide information that enables consumers to make food
choices that are better aligned with their preferences than when the infor-
mation was unavailable (Teisl et al., 2001).  Such a benefit will accrue even
if labeling does not result in measurable changes in nutritional or health
outcomes.  Consumers may act as if they have nutrient or health-risk
budgets—the new information may allow consumers to gain utility by
substituting among foods while bearing the same health risk as before.14
Tiesl et al. (2001) investigated such consumer welfare gains using a
demand system estimated from supermarket scanner data and found them
to be substantial.
Costs of Labeling
As with other food-labeling initiatives (e.g., Teisl and Roe, 2001), the finan-
cial cost of food-away-from-home nutrition labeling would have many
components.  First, the regulatory agency would expend funds to decide
what information to disclose, to design a standardized label, and to monitor
compliance.  The food-away-from-home sector is so varied in terms of
scale, menus, and practices that designing a standardized labeling approach
would be challenging.  A second cost component, borne by the firms, would
14Studies cited in the box titled
“Effect of Nutrition Information on
Food-Away-From-Home Intakes” give
evidence of consumers’ altering their
subsequent intake when information
about current intake is disclosed.
12There are additional reasons to
be cautious about these estimates.
Factors other than the NLEA, includ-
ing competitive strategies adopted by
manufacturers in response to changes
in consumer preferences, could have
influenced reformulations between
1989-91 and 1994-96.  Also, differen-
tial price changes in at-home and
away-from-home foods could influ-
ence the results.16
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include expenses for printing labels on wrappings and menu boards.  A third
and much larger cost component would be expenses borne by firms, espe-
cially independent establishments, to standardize menus and alter food
procurement and preparation practices to meet labeling requirements.  This
cost, plus the cost of analyzing recipes for nutrient content, would be recur-
ring as firms introduce new food items or change recipes.  High costs may
deter firms, especially independent establishments, from changing recipes
and introducing new menu items.15 In a 1994 study of major foodservice
corporations, menu- and personnel-related obstacles were cited as the major
reasons against nutrition labeling (Almanza et al., 1997).  Menu-related
obstacles included too many menu variations, limited space on menus for
labeling, and loss of flexibility in changing the menu.  Personnel-related
obstacles included difficulty in training a constantly changing employee
force and lack of time for foodservice personnel to implement labeling.  
While product reformulation may confer benefits to consumers, the refor-
mulation process would cost the producers.  Reformulating away-from-
home food offerings will be different from reformulating packaged foods
because much of the food-away-from-home sector caters prepared meals
rather than individual ingredients that make up a meal as in the packaged
foods sector.  Given the link between taste and the amount of dietary
components such as fat, salt, and sugar used in preparation, reformulating
existing recipes or formulating new recipes to lower the amounts of these
components while preserving taste will be especially challenging (Muth et
al., 2004).
Another cost of a food-away-from-home labeling policy could come from
the loss of shareholder wealth that results from declines in the stock prices
of away-from-home food firms if a mandatory labeling requirement is
enacted.  Any regulatory event that imposes costs on producers would
impact shareholders’ wealth based on the market’s assessment of the role
that the event may play in the future growth of the firms.  Gahni and Childs
(1999) investigated the wealth effects of the passage of the NLEA by exam-
ining the stock price reaction of 38 large U.S. multinational food corpora-
tions.  They studied stock price reaction to four separate events during
NLEA’s passage and found that all four events had an adverse impact on
shareholders’ wealth.
Just as some consumers may value labeling that enables them to match their
purchases with their preferences, the additional information from labels may
impose cognitive costs on other consumers (Roe et al., 1999; Teisl and Roe,
2001).  The additional information provided by labels may actually decrease
the consumer’s ability to process other information such as nutrient content
claims on menus already permitted under current laws.  Further, many
consumers may not desire to have such information, or may be burdened by
the additional information since they may not associate restaurant dining
with controlling their diet (National Restaurant Association, 2002b).
Consumers may believe that it is less important to consider the nutritional
quality of food away from home or be less willing to sacrifice taste when
eating out (Guthrie et al., 2002).  In Stubenitsky et al.’s (2000) randomized
15Most food-away-from-home
labeling proposals under debate are
targeted toward chain restaurants.17
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trial of full- and reduced-fat meals with and without nutrition information,
researchers “observed a trend toward lower selection of the lower fat dish
among subjects informed of its lower fat status…” (emphasis added).
Another study of restaurant menu labeling reported that taste was the
primary reason given by patrons for their entrée choice, regardless of
whether or not it was labeled (Albright et al., 1990).
Conclusion
The trends toward higher consumption and lower nutritional quality of food
away from home are the outcome of the economic forces of supply and
demand.  Away-from-home-food is of lower dietary quality not just because
providers supply such food, but also because there is consumer demand for
such food—or its attributes such as taste and convenience. At the same time,
market characteristics suggest that the information disclosure mechanism
may result in a lack of nutritional information for buyers.  Sellers have an
incentive not to disclose “negative” attributes about their products because
these same ingredients usually enhance taste.  To the extent that this lack of
disclosure leads to consumption levels that would differ if buyers were
better informed, asymmetric information might be creating an inefficient
market outcome.  Suboptimal consumption of food away from home may
also occur if some consumers have self-control problems, exacerbated by a
lack of readily accessible nutritional information.  Depending on the
severity of these “market failures,” a mandatory food-away-from-home
labeling policy requiring disclosure of nutrition information may increase
transaction efficiency between sellers and buyers in the food-away-from-
home market.  The economic basis for deciding on such a policy would crit-
ically depend on accurately estimating the benefits and costs of alternative
policy options.
If a specific food-away-from-home labeling policy is devised, the financial
cost of implementation can be assessed reasonably well.  The aggregate cost
will depend chiefly on the extent of the away-from-home food sector that is
subject to the mandatory disclosure requirement.  The benefits of the
labeling policy, on the other hand, would be harder to assess.  This results
from uncertainty surrounding the effect of label information on the intended
behavior.  Would providing additional nutrition information in a restaurant
setting lead to better overall diet quality and reduced caloric intakes?
Recent research on this subject suggests a limited impact.  This uncertainty,
plus the uncertainty of attributing any change in health outcomes to a
specific labeling policy change, makes the calculation of benefits difficult.
Although product reformulation appears to be by far the biggest source of
benefits, there is some uncertainty regarding the degree and persistence of
reformulation.
Besides the overall benefit-cost ratio, the distribution of the benefits and
costs among producers and consumers may be an additional factor that
could influence a labeling policy decision.  Due to differences in economies
of scale, types of offerings, and recipe standardization, a labeling policy
could differentially affect away-from-home food providers, potentially
putting some at a competitive disadvantage.  Such effects will have to be
weighed in a labeling decision.  On the consumer side, there is some uncer-18
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tainty as to who specifically will benefit from the nutrition information
provided by the labels.  Will the benefits be reaped mainly by those who
already have good quality diets and healthy weights (who may use the new
information to further optimize their dietary choices and health), or will the
benefits also be shared by those with poor diets and the overweight?
Economic theory suggests that those who use an input most heavily also
benefit the most from a reduction in the price of that input.  For this reason,
government policies that reduce the price of health inputs can increase
health disparities (Goldman and Lakdawalla, 2001).  The reduction in the
price of nutrition information brought about by a labeling policy could
therefore be most beneficial to heavy users of that information—usually the
more educated, who also tend to have better diets and healthier weights to
begin with.  In this case, although a labeling policy may realize a significant
benefit, little of that benefit may be accruing to the less educated and low-
income segments of the population.
Nutrition information is just one type of information that may be of interest
to consumers.  As new production processes evolve and new risks are identi-
fied, additional concerns such as labeling of organic food, biotech content,
and pesticide use are being raised (Teisl and Roe, 2001).  Given competing
disclosure demands and limited label space, a policy to disclose all, based
on existence of asymmetric information, would not be practical or cost-
effective.  Accurate estimates of potential benefits and costs of each type of
information become more important.  In this scenario, developing an
optimal information policy may require considering approaches other than
mandatory labeling.
One such alternative approach in the food-away-from-home sector may be
reducing the requirements for making voluntary health claims.  Under the
present regime, the cost of making claims may be high enough to deter
many away-from-home food providers from providing any nutrition infor-
mation at all (Boger, 1995; Muth et al., 2004).  In the packaged foods
market, relaxation of health-claim regulations have had a positive impact on
voluntary information provision, leading to a decrease in fat, saturated fat,
and cholesterol consumption (Mathios and Ippolito, 1999).  A relaxed
health-claims policy, however, has to be weighed against the possibility that
it may increase the likelihood of deceptive and misleading claims.  Mayer et
al. (1998) compared health claims on snack cracker packaging and fat
content during pre- and post-NLEA periods and found that the prevalence of
potentially misleading claims declined from 77 percent in 1991 to 49
percent in 1995.
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